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1ENTANGLING THE MEDICAL 
HUMANITIES
Des Fitzgerald and Felicity Callard
Introduction
The medical humanities are at a critical juncture. On the one hand, practitioners of this fi eld can bask in their recent successes: in the UK, at least, what was once 
a loose set of intuitions – broadly about animating the clinical and research spaces of 
biomedicine with concepts and methods from the humanities – has become a visible 
and coherent set of interventions, with its own journals, conferences, centres, funding 
streams and students.1 On the other hand, the growth, coherence and stratifi cation of 
this heterogeneous domain have raised the spectre of just what, exactly, the medical 
humanities is growing into.2 In particular, scholars have begun to worry that the suc-
cess of the medical humanities is tied up with being useful to biomedicine, that the 
medical humanities has been able to establish itself only by appearing as the domain 
of pleasant (but more or less inconsequential) helpmeets – lurking hopefully, poetry 
books in hand, at the edges of the clinical encounter’s ‘primal scene’.3 This is, we know, 
a caricature; still, it is not without its truth. Some, then, have begun to ask what a 
more critical medical humanities would look like: how might the methodological and 
intellectual legacies of the humanities intervene more consequentially in the clinical 
research practices of biomedicine – situating accounts of illness, suffering, intervention 
and cure in a much thicker4 attention to the social, human and cultural contexts in 
which those accounts, as well as the bodies to which they attend, become both think-
able and visible?5
Our contribution to this space is to focus on the ‘medical humanities’ as an explic-
itly interdisciplinary endeavour – with a specifi cally integrationist intent. In what fol-
lows, we explore the contours of the methodological and conceptual space that crosses 
the humanities and the medical sciences; in particular, we open up the relationship 
that the medical humanities, including its many inheritances, has to the practices and 
apparatuses of the biomedical sciences. We are especially interested in whether the 
concerns, objects, methods and preoccupations of the medical humanities, not least 
the fi gure of the human at their centre, are, in fact, neatly separable or dissociable 
from the concerns, objects, methods and preoccupations of the medical and life sci-
ences. And if these are – as we contend – actually not very separable at all; if the fi gures 
and preoccupations of the medical humanities are, in fact, deeply and irretrievably 
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entangled in the vital, corporeal and physiological commitments of biomedicine; then, 
beyond well-rehearsed concessions to inter- and trans-disciplinarity, how might we 
more critically imagine what, exactly, a medical humanities practice is going to look 
like in the present century? 
This chapter is part of a wider set of interventions in which we are challenging 
some of the dominant ways in which interdisciplinary spaces are being conceptual-
ised.6 Our aim is to open up the topology, territory and traffi c of the ‘medical humani-
ties’ as it has lately emerged; in particular, we want to disrupt an intellectual economy 
in which all animating liveliness is accrued by the humanities, and all hard-nosed 
scientifi c expertise by the biomedical sciences. Our argument has four steps: fi rstly, 
we focus on how much of the conceptual and practical underpinning of the medical 
humanities is premised on a model of integration, and we ask whether much of the 
theoretically and biologically conservative stance of the medical humanities can be 
traced to this image; in the second and third sections, we introduce a counter-image – 
entanglement – drawn especially from the work of Karen Barad, and explore how this 
helps us to move beyond the integrationist account; fi nally, we focus on deployments 
of the ‘human’ in the medical humanities, to show how entanglement can reinscribe – 
and reanimate – some of the central preoccupations of this literature. 
Being Integrated
Over a decade ago, just before the 2004 annual meeting of the Association for Medical 
Humanities, Martyn Evans and Jane Macnaughton refl ected on the fi eld’s relationship 
to inter- and multi-disciplinarity. Arguing against a model that positions the medical 
humanities as a series of polite exchanges between a range of disciplines, Evans and 
Macnaughton called instead for a particular form of interdisciplinarity in the medical 
humanities – defi ned as ‘the engagement of disciplines one with another, and more 
particularly with subject matter that somehow both straddles the disciplines and falls 
between them’.7 To make this case, Evans and Macnaughton distinguished between 
two modes in which the medical humanities are practised: in one, scholars from dif-
ferent disciplines gather around a shared preoccupation, but ‘with each discipline . . . 
essentially retaining its own unique viewpoint and writing from its own literature’.8 In 
the other, more ‘radical’ model, scholars instead depart from their own discipline, and: 
integrate the viewpoints of whichever disciplines seem most relevant to the ques-
tions they are asking . . . . [These scholars] will not be constrained within the view-
point of historian, anthropologist or philosopher but will build a perspective that 
is unique to the discipline called ‘medical humanities’.9
Evans and Macnaughton, while acknowledging the risks of this endeavour (not least to 
the job prospects of junior pioneers), advocated strongly for the integrationist mode: 
‘medical humanities is by nature an interdisciplinary study’, they pointed out, ‘and in 
this way it can make its most effective contributions to knowledge and to teaching.’10 
Rather than simply developing a series of interesting conversations across boundaries, 
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the medical humanities must, Evans and Macnaughton argued, bring different disci-
plines together: ‘we need to encourage young academics into the fi eld’, they insisted, 
‘whose doctoral studies will make them into interdisciplinarians.’11
Some of what is at stake here can be traced to the pragmatics of intellectual entre-
preneurship. But we also suggest that this contribution forms a careful and succinct 
distillation of a vital debate – between the singular and the plural, or the additive 
and the integrative – that surrounds discussions of just what kind of fi eld the medical 
humanities might or should be. A few years earlier, Evans and Greaves,12 in promot-
ing the launch of the journal Medical Humanities, and in offering another equally 
self-conscious ‘foundational’ moment for the constitution of the fi eld, committed their 
endeavour to an ‘integrated’ and thus more ‘ambitious’ vision for the medical humani-
ties – ‘whereby the nature, goals, and knowledge base of clinical medicine itself are seen 
as shaped by the understanding and relief of human bodily suffering.’13 Or, as Arnott 
et al. put it in their ‘Proposal for an Academic Association for Medical Humanities’: 
The medical humanities should be viewed as integral to medicine (i.e. as constitu-
tive of our understanding of medicine’s nature and goals, alongside the medical 
sciences rather than as a series of optional extras to an essentially scientifi c concep-
tion of medicine.14 
Similar images can be discerned elsewhere – in desires, for example, that the medical 
humanities ‘overcome the separation’ of clinical and humanistic inquiry,15 or in hopes 
that the humanities will be ‘incorporated into educational activities to help students 
examine and, at times, contest the process, values, and goals of medical practice’.16 Of 
course, tropes of ‘integration’ or ‘unifi cation’ are far from limited to the medical human-
ities; other recent interdisciplinary endeavours have also been gripped by such language 
of integration.17 Given the current pull that interdisciplinarity exerts on the academy 
today, we treat the domain of the medical humanities as an exemplary – though far 
from unique – site through which to explore and challenge the dominant topologies, 
abstractions and utopian endpoints that govern the terrain of interdisciplinarity. 
Many of the clarion calls that have been made on behalf of the medical humanities 
rely implicitly or explicitly on a particular kind of medical holism. This is the ‘perception’, 
as Brian Hurwitz and Paul Dakin put it:
that science alone (or science with additive glances that take in ethics and the social 
sciences) provides insuffi cient overall foundation for holistic understandings of the 
interaction between health, illness and disease.18
Such a holism, in its turn, justifi es and requires some more integral conception of medical 
education and research involving the humanities, broadly interpreted – a view of the ‘med-
ical endeavour’ that is ‘part science, part craft and part art’.19 Or, as Gillie Bolton puts it: 
Medical and healthcare practice, education and research primarily concern indi-
vidual people, each of whom, made up of inextricably linked psychological, emo-
tional, spiritual and physical elements, is also inevitably impinged upon by cultural 
and social forces.20
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In this view, holistic understandings of the body, as well as its illnesses, require much 
richer conceptions of both doctoring and healing – the medical humanities must thus 
be integral to, or incorporated in, medical education and research.
There are two things to pay attention to here: one is an imaginary of what the medi-
cal humanities must be – integrative, holistic, rounded, ambitious and so on. The other 
is a metaphorical repertoire – a set of received images, terms and likenesses – that works 
to license this imaginary, and more precisely, to spatialise the territory between, across 
and/or through humanistic and clinical thought. Our interest is thus in what precisely is 
intended by – and what is mobilised through – an insistence that the medical humanities 
must proceed according to a spatial logic of integration. Because it seems to us that if 
this integrated, singular medical humanities is preferable to a multi-disciplinary com-
mitment to polite (yet determinedly insular) exchange, still it contains its own commit-
ment to a particular ‘regime of the inter-’. If the commitment to an integrated medical 
humanities has indeed, in recent years, been an important and even radical move for the 
emergence of this fi eld, we want to claim that it none the less mobilises a very particular 
account (let us say: a decidedly conservative account) of what kinds of things disciplines 
are; about what forms of spatial arrangement position them against one another; about 
what relations of exchange are appropriate across them; and about what must thereby 
constitute the, variously, human, cultural, biological and embodied agencies to which 
they attend. To be blunt: we are not sure whether any serious ambition to comprehend, 
and to intervene in, the density, complexity, directionality and capacity of traffi c across 
this space can be at all moved by a desire for ‘integration’ – including the very space of 
‘the inter-’ in which this desire operates.
We argue that a more critical conception of the medical humanities needs to bring 
into question the ‘inter-’ of the ‘interdisciplinary’ medical humanities. Can the intel-
lectual space of the medical humanities more radically reconfi gure the objects, agencies 
and practices of clinical attention, beyond the now rather sterile distinction between 
a multi- and inter-disciplinarity? Beyond the territory of the ‘inter-’, can we imagine a 
more risky and experimental medical humanities? Can we mobilise a medical humani-
ties that is not only a novel interdiscipline, gathering up different things into an insti-
tutionally signifi cant whole, but also a much more ambiguous and risky intellectual 
space – one willing to navigate the deep entanglements of subjectivity, experience, 
pathology, incorporation, and so on, which cut across the ways in which we under-
stand both the human and her medicine today? 
Getting Entangled
In recent years, ‘entanglement’, a term central to twentieth-century quantum phys-
ics,21 has been widely used across a host of literatures in the humanities and social 
sciences – often to nuance accounts of how different agencies may or may not be sepa-
rable from one another. ‘Entanglement’ has been used, for example, to characterise 
the affective relations and discontinuities between human bodies and other entities;22 
to make sense of settler identities in colonial and postcolonial contexts;23 and to open 
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up the relationships, similarities and intersections between human and non-human 
things.24 But it is especially in science and technology studies (STS), and most par-
ticularly in feminist STS, that ‘entanglement’ has been put to work in the last decade 
or so. STS scholars have invoked the term to help parse, for example, human culture 
in an age of ecological crisis;25 to think the space between language and databases in 
science fi ction26; to open up the relationship between persons and species in North 
Atlantic societies;27 and to make visible the rationalities and continuities between 
scholarly registers of science, ethics and justice.28 Much of this prominence can be 
traced to the potent work of Karen Barad, and especially to the carefully wrought 
metaphysics that Barad names as ‘agential realism’.29 Among the many things at stake 
in this coinage, for Barad, is fi rstly a shift from thinking relationality as process of 
interaction (in which more or less bounded things engage with one another) to one of 
‘intra-action’ – a neologism that refuses prior wholeness as the condition of intersec-
tion. Barad’s ‘agential realism’ takes the existence of discrete agencies very seriously, 
but it takes these forms as secondary to the intersection of those agencies – and indeed 
it is precisely the ‘dividual’ nature of agencies (to borrow a term from anthropolo-
gist Marilyn Strathern)30 that Barad holds to be the ‘primary ontological units’ of the 
world.31 Secondly, what this means for Barad is that we cannot easily divide the prac-
tices (or objects) of ‘science’ and ‘medicine’ from the practices (or objects) of social 
and humanistic inquiry that are interested in understanding (and maybe contributing 
to) scientifi c medical domains. We do not, as scholars from various disciplines, bring 
our objects and practices to another through a kind of free-trade agreement; rather 
we re-enter a long history of binding, tangling and cutting, within which current 
moves towards integration are much more weighted than they might at fi rst seem.32 
What holds together much of the research employing ‘entanglement’ is an intuition 
that some set of things, commonly held to be separate from one another (indeed, that 
defi ne themselves precisely with reference to their separability) – science and justice, 
humans and non-humans, settlers and natives – not only might have something in 
common, but also, in fact, may be quite inseparable from one another. ‘What often 
appear as separate entities (and separate sets of concerns) with sharp edges’, remarks 
Barad, ‘does not actually entail a relation of absolute exteriority at all.’33 In this chap-
ter, we contend that working with a dynamics of entanglement – rather than a telos of 
integration – sets in motion a more experimental and capacious future for the medical 
humanities.34 Elsewhere, we have set out our own programmatic vision for a broader 
sense of ‘experimental entanglements’ across the humanities, the social sciences and 
the life sciences.35 There, we attempt to mobilise a different set of epistemological com-
mitments vis-à-vis how the self-proclaimed humanist or interpretive social scientist 
might approach matters commonly considered the province of the life sciences. We 
have also tried to conjure a different palette of affective dispositions through which 
we might both characterise and live in interdisciplinary spaces. Those dispositions 
(eddying around ambivalence, awkwardness, frustration, failure, and so on) depart 
from the most common affective registers (critique, adulation, disinterested rigour) 
through which humanists have tended to approach the terrain of the medical, clinical 
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or biomedical.36 We want resolutely to claim the stance of interestedness. But we also 
see interest as a stance that can be (indeed, usually is) taken up without someone quite 
knowing the place at which they stand, or the entwinements through which they are 
always-already bound with/in other interested agencies. So it is to be entangled. 
In short, we are committed to arguing, in current and future work, that a turn to 
entanglement – as epistemology, ontology and phenomenological-affective disposi-
tion – might herald a more interesting future for scholars learning to live ‘between’ 
disciplines; in this chapter, specifi cally, we want to suggest that such a stance might 
allow for a more critical engagement with the sets of material, bodily, affective, lin-
guistic and disciplinary confi gurations within which both the medical humanities, 
and those phenomena that they draw within their purview, are endlessly bound. To 
do so, we fi x attention on what Barad intends by entanglement, and here we draw 
on one of the lesser-known iterations of her argument: the essay ‘Living in a Post-
humanist Material World’,37 in which Barad turns to think about one of the most 
central objects of the medical humanities – that is, life. Barad begins her account with 
perhaps the best-known intersection of quantum dynamics and life: the paradox of 
Schrödinger’s cat. In this thought experiment, Schrödinger asks us to consider a cat 
in a box that also contains a nuclear atom with a fi fty per cent chance of decaying 
in one hour, as well as a fl ask of hydrocyanic acid. If the atom does decay, a series of 
reactions will break the fl ask of acid, thus killing the cat. After one hour, then, the cat 
might be alive, and it might be dead; in any event, all we can do to express the state of 
the cat, at that moment, is generate an equation that superposes the two states – that 
smears the dead cat across the living. Barad reminds us that the issue here is not, as it 
is often taken to be, that the cat is therefore either alive or dead (and that therefore we 
just do not know yet); nor is it that the cat is neither alive nor dead; similarly, the issue 
is neither that the cat is both alive and dead, nor that it is a little bit alive, and also a 
little bit dead (the latter likely describes the metaphysical condition of many cats, just 
not this one).38 The issue is that the equation describes a state in which:
the cat and the atom do not have separately determinate states of existence . . . 
indeed [what the story demonstrates is that] there is no determinately bounded and 
propertied entity that we normally identify with the word ‘cat’ independently of 
some measurement that resolves the indeterminacy and specifi es the appropriate 
referents for the concepts of ‘cat’ and ‘life state’.39 
The cat, in this circumstance, ‘simply has no determinate life state . . . there is no deter-
minate fact of the matter about whether it is dead or alive’.40 The point, for Barad, is 
that ‘things do not have inherently determinate boundaries and properties . . . words 
do not have inherently determinate meanings.’41 The key point for us, similarly, is that 
determinacy – ‘wholeness’, we might say in another context – is only a function of 
specifi c material arrangements; things, people, concepts, ideas and so on, are cut clear 
of their interdependencies only as a function of those interdependencies themselves. 
Being intersected is a condition of agency; intersecting is neither a function, nor a use, 
of those agencies’ prior completeness. 
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For Barad, as for Schrödinger, what is precisely at stake here is how to account 
for life. Confronted with the smeared cat, the fact is, says Barad, ‘life just ain’t 
what it used to be, if it ever was.’42 Life-conditions are defi nable only through spe-
cifi c ‘measurement intra-actions’.43 In this sense, the referent of measurement for 
Barad is not a bounded ‘object’ – ‘life’, the patient, an unfeeling doctor, a consoling 
poem – but what Barad calls phenomena: what we are always in pursuit of, when 
we measure, are ‘entangled and enfolded sets of apparatuses of bodily production 
of all the beings and devices relevant to this specifi c example’.44 Our methodologi-
cal task is thus one of ‘accountability to and for differences that matter’.45 And our 
investigations, as well as the devices and apparatus that make them possible, are 
‘not mere static arrangements in the world’ – rather, they are themselves ‘material-
discursive confi gurations of the world . . . through which specifi c boundaries are 
enacted’.46 Boundaries, whether between different ways of measuring things or 
between the act of measuring and the thing measured, do not mark differences to 
be overcome in the act of integration. Boundaries are instead things we produce – 
that we have to produce – through specifi c intra-active confi gurations and perfor-
mances. Practices of making boundaries are fully implicated in the dynamics of 
intra-activity through which phenomena come to matter: ‘discursive practices and 
material phenomena do not stand in a relationship of externality to one another,’ 
Barad remarks: ‘rather, the material and the discursive are mutually implicated in 
the dynamics of intra-activity.’47
Differences That Matter
This is, we are aware, perhaps an obscure account of how one might disrupt the 
‘inter-’ and/or ‘multi-’disciplinary nature of the medical humanities. Our theoretical-
rhetorical arguments are intended to open a space for future, empirically fi ne-grained 
analyses of practices of boundary-making in the medical humanities terrain. What we 
want to insist on here is that when we talk about ‘entangling the medical humanities’, 
we are not simply introducing a new metaphor, or asking our colleagues to rearrange 
the disciplinary deckchairs. Instead, we are drawing attention to the fact that the pre-
occupations of the medical humanities are always going to be particular kinds of, or 
moments in, sets of as yet undetermined material-semiotic confi gurations and align-
ments (bodily, pathological, cultural, human, and so on) – whether this is acknowl-
edged institutionally or not. This implies that we need to see the current favoured topoi 
of medical humanities scholarship, and the differentiations that those topoi bring into 
being – a quickly assembled list would surely include the suffering patient, a doctor’s 
practice of clinical care, the exemplary site of the clinic, and cancer – as congealed, 
and overly resonant confi gurations that constitute but one particular way of mak-
ing phenomena come to matter. But what if the task of the medical humanities were 
to encourage the emergence of different topoi, or the limning of different topologies 
through which illness and care are constituted? What if illness were not imagined, for 
example, as co-located with or coincidental to a body? 48 
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Within such an imaginary, one could argue that the most pressing sites of the bio-
political redistribution of bodily potencies (with all that they connote in relation to 
questions of medicine and health) might not include the bioethically over-invested 
scene of the prone fi gure hooked up to a life support machine; one might then explore, 
instead, assemblages of welfare policies, psychometric tests, affective dispositions and 
algorithmic predictions that are in the process of redistributing categories and mani-
festations of productive labour and idleness under practices of ‘workfare’.49 Or, to take 
another example, one might approach a healthcare ‘institution’ not as a conceptual 
and physical edifi ce whose histories we have become used to tracing (the National 
Health Service, the World Health Organisation, the hospital), but as something that 
gives form or order precisely by ‘cutting’ or ‘disentangling’ entities from a hetero-
geneous fi eld. Tiago Moreira, for example, has examined how the emergence of the 
systematic review in healthcare is an entity brought into the world by ‘disentangl[ing] 
data from the milieus in which they are commonly found’, and endowing these data 
with new qualities that are enabled by their collection and dissemination through new 
techno-political means.50
We might go on. But the point here is not to introduce a new range of topics that 
will ‘count’ as ‘medical humanities’. The point is, rather, to break open the two halves 
of that term, such that the complex of human life and medical science becomes – to 
borrow from an analysis of interspecies health – a series of:
repeated crossings, an ongoing conversation – a repetitive material semiotics, or a 
working out of a new reality. Contagion, then, is more than contact and viruses 
don’t simply diffuse across space, or extend across a plane through simple trans-
mission. They are confi gured in relation.51
An integrated medical humanities, by contrast, is always going to presuppose bound-
aries that obscure these differences – and, indeed, render them invisible. Thus the issue 
is not that illness and healing are multi-faceted phenomena that cannot be understood 
from a clinical perspective only, and that require a new, interdisciplinary perspective to 
be appreciated in their wholeness. The issue is that what get enacted, positioned and 
understood as moments of suffering, sickness, care, and so on are always in the process 
of being cut from particular sets of relations.52 What we need methodologically, then, 
is a way of thinking, writing and measuring life-states that ‘stays with the trouble’53 of 
these relations and differences. 
The medical humanities does not need to break down boundaries, but rather to 
understand how practices of making, breaking and shifting boundaries constitute ill-
ness and healing. Accordingly, we call for closer attention to the political as well as 
to the ontological consequences of installing boundaries that constitute some scenes, 
rather than others. By the same token, the medical humanities does not need to inte-
grate different perspectives into a unifi ed whole in order to appreciate an entity in its 
complexity; it needs to understand how perspectives themselves are already – and this 
is no shame – moments of relation, both with one another, and with what they take to 
be their objects. The point is that integration is layered on confi gurations of relations; 
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it is not generative of them. An entangled medical humanities does not ask for dif-
ferences to be overcome; it asks how differences have come to matter in sickness and 
health; it tries to think how their mattering might be brought into richer understanding 
through specifi c moments of intervention. 
The Figure of the Human
If the task is to think how practices of making, breaking and shifting boundaries 
constitute moments of illness and healing, then we need to displace, if not signifi -
cantly reimagine, how medical humanities has tended to fi gure the ‘human’ – an 
entity whose boundaries have commonly been understood to end at her skin. In the 
same move, we need to displace a model in which empathic or caring humanism is 
positioned as ready to tame the clinical coldness of the biomedical – or in which the 
inventiveness of the ‘human spirit’ is imagined as ready to combat the deadening 
and reductive effects of scientifi c rationalism.54 Such a cathexis is at odds with much 
of the terrain beyond the medical humanities, which has long placed the categories 
that we fantasise as more or less solid – the ‘natural’, the ‘cultural’, the ‘social’, the 
‘human’ – under pressure. The suturing together of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ in the com-
posite term ‘natureculture’55 points, at least in part, to the need to grapple with the 
biosocial complexity of life-states. Such complexity has been explicitly or implicitly 
avoided by many humanistic and interpretative social-scientifi c scholars – not least 
in the medical humanities – who have frequently wielded the adjectives ‘biological’ 
or ‘biomedical’ as indicators of distaste or condemnation.56 Concomitant with the 
rise of terms such as ‘natureculture’, a growing number of researchers have been 
challenging the singularity of the human (along with all her commonly privileged 
qualities of creativity, intentionality, wilfulness and agency) by tracing the inventive-
ness and motility of the non-human.57 
Indeed, such inventiveness is increasingly understood to be found beyond ‘living’ 
entities – ‘human’ and ‘non-human’ – and to encompass, for example, the energet-
ics of the geologic.58 If we remain ambivalent about the neo-vitalist optimism that 
can spring forth, untethered, in some of this work, we are also struck by its dark 
undertow.59 And if such preoccupations seem to be at some distance from the usual 
concerns of the medical humanities, we none the less invoke them to displace the 
common calculus within medical humanities whereby the ‘biomedical’ registers as the 
cold and deadening engine of facts, and the ‘humanities’ as the non-reductive and life-
affi rming context-expert. Of course, for many, the biomedical retains both an histo-
riographical and a territorial resonance – and tracing the contours of this domain (not 
least in postcolonial contexts60) remains both a potent and a lively scholarly activity. 
Our wish is not to displace the category of the biomedical as such but – and, indeed, 
in league with historical and postcolonial scholarship – to open up to its liveliness, 
its idiosyncrasy, its sense of internal contest and its strangeness. We are in search of a 
different set of dynamics for the medical humanities – one in which both the genera-
tive and the inert are properties of an entangled fi eld of bio/social/cultural life: one 
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that would not establish at its heart those wearyingly familiar encomia – an ‘ethical 
life’ and a ‘good death’. 
In previous work,61 we have explored such dynamics in the space of the cogni-
tive neuroscientifi c experiment, a space whose uncanny generativity has not been 
fully recognised by its many, often critical, humanist onlookers. We used our own 
encounters with the experiment to redirect the rhythms of stale humanities-versus-
sciences debates, and the familiar stagings of the subjective/objective and the human/
non-human that coagulate around them. We are interested in setting into motion 
rich archives of experimentation within the arts, humanities and interpretive social 
sciences by braiding them through the framework of laboratory science – not to 
‘reduce’ the former, but to reshape and reimagine the conceptual and empirical con-
tours of the latter.62 In particular, we want to insert (at least) two humans – the 
experimenter and her ‘subject’ – into a complex experimental apparatus comprising 
other instruments and entities, and thereby to remain agnostic about the role that 
each part within this assemblage might play. We refuse to take for granted who or 
what probes whom or what in an experiment; when the human subject becomes an 
object and when she might remain a speaking subject; which other entities might 
‘speak’ within the experimental set-up; and what the possibilities of infl uence and 
suggestion might hold for torqueing paradigms and resulting data within the cogni-
tive neuroscientifi c experiment. 
Let us, in closing, propose an equivalent manœuvre for the critical medical humani-
ties. What difference would it make for us to remain agnostic about what does and 
does not count as a medical intervention or apparatus? What would happen if we 
remained open about where (or what, or who) the thinking, feeling subject is within 
medical mise-en-scènes? What if disease were not a bodily fact that needed fi ner inter-
pretation, but a way of describing a relation between a body, a history and an environ-
ment? What if, across such interpretive labours, we could think more radically about 
the role that everyone (practitioners, writers, experimenters and patients of different 
stripes) might play? What possibilities might open up for the medical humanities, for 
example, if we discerned a world of awkward, lachrymose, over-involved clinicians, 
on the one hand, and cold, pragmatic, resolutely scalpellic poets on the other? Indeed, 
it is precisely in the opening up of such questions that we see the promise of the critical 
medical humanities.
Conclusion
We have tried to sketch here, in abbreviated and gestural form, an outline for what we 
call an entangled medical humanities. By invoking entanglement, we wish to turn the 
attention of medical humanities practitioners and theorists from the problematic of 
‘integration’ to one of ‘differences’ – in other words, from a need to come together, to 
a recognition that both medicine and life itself are constituted precisely through rela-
tions, and through practices of bordering, cutting and exchange through which those 
relations come to matter. There is thus neither an additive nor an integrative ‘human’ 
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at the heart of the medical humanities; there are, rather, animacies,63 vitalities and 
pathologies, which fl ow across different practices and preoccupations that then come 
to be ascribed to the ‘humanities’ and the ‘biosciences’. 
If our chapter has offered a largely theoretical account of those fl ows and forces, at 
its heart is, none the less, a signifi cantly reanimated research programme for the medi-
cal humanities. Entanglement eschews what we see as the frequently defensive appa-
ratus of the fi eld – one that has tended, despite its investment in plurality, to prescribe 
compelling sites of animation and analysis. An entangled medical humanities claims, 
in contrast, no privileged access to ‘narratives’ of illness and healing, to the ‘experi-
ence’ of illness, to ‘refl ections’ on doctoring, to insights on ‘care’, to normative or 
‘ethical’ analysis and so on. But it also rejects any claim from a conservatively defi ned, 
narrowly bioscientifi c laboratory science to have unique access to the body and its 
ailments, to be the only interpreter and preserver of the vital capacities of that body, 
or to be uniquely intimate with its corporeal malfunctions. What would happen, for 
and to the medical humanities, if we set aside our usual allegiances and identifi cations 
to think more experimentally about the constitution and dynamics of the medical-
humanistic domain? Tracing such trajectories of entanglement is what we have tried 
to begin in this chapter. 
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